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Would the 1995 Balanced Budget Amendment
be an Effective Mechanism for
Stabilizing Public Debt?
James Harbaugh
ABSTRACT.  The 1995 Balanced Budget Amendment for is often brought up as a way to
stabilize the public debt.  But how would it operate, what implications would it have for
U.S. public finance or macroeconomic conditions, and would it be effective at controlling
whatever threat the federal debt poses?  After the bill failed in 1995, two economists
published opposing views on the effectiveness of the failed amendment.  Examining their
arguments and history, it remains unclear whether the 1995 amendment could effectively
control the federal debt.
I.  Introduction
For 2011, the U.S. Statistical Abstract (2012, 469, 472, 474) estimated
that the four largest federal expenditure programs cost $2.3230 trillion,
while total federal revenues only amounted to $2.1737 trillion.  These
four expenditure programs (Defense, Social Security, Medicare, and
Medicaid) alone outpaced all revenues but only account for 59.9% of all
expenditures in the United States’ unified budget.  Including the other
~40% of expenditures, the total federal deficit amounted to an estimated
$1.6451 trillion.  The same year, Congress passed a Budget Control Act
to cap discretionary defense spending and non-defense spending in
attempt to reduce future deficits and the growing federal debt (Govtrack
2013).
The U.S. federal debt is as old as the country itself.  Born during the
Revolutionary War, the first federal debt was guaranteed by Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 2 of the Consitution.  In the U.S., fear of debt is perhaps
just as old as debt itself.  Thomas Jefferson had anxiety over the misuse
of federal debt. In 1835, President Andrew Jackson and his
contemporaries achieved the first and only period when the federal debt
was zero.  This was largely made possible by the use of restrictive tariffs
and government sale of massive lands seized from natives. Sadly, this
anti-debt strategy ended with a five-year recession due to the bank panic
of 1837.  Public debt in the pre-Keynesian era was largely a product of
wars, such as the civil war, which produced a clause in the 14th
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amendment that invalidated Confederate debt (Rosen and Gayer 2010,
461-473).  After World War II the federal government had a 91-94%
marginal tax rate for the top bracket until 1964 to deal with the massive
wartime debt (OMB 2013, 2.1).   In 2011 a constitutional amendment to
permanently balance discretionary and mandatory spending with taxes
failed.
The idea of a balanced budget amendment for the federal government
is not new.  Forty-nine out of fifty states have some form of
constitutionally forced balanced budget, but the states’ budgets are
different from the federal budget.  Only the operating budgets have to be
balanced for states, while their capital budgets allow debt for pensions
and investments.  The federal government uses a unified budget that
lumps both areas together but does not include some “off budget items.”
Balancing a unified budget is not the same as balancing an operating
budget, so comparisons between the federal budget and states’ budgets
are not equitable (Rosen and Gayer 2010, 132).  
The amendment to balance the federal budget has petitions from
thirty two state legislatures and needs thirty four to start the constitutional
process from the state side (Glaeser 2011).  On the federal side, the
amendment came closest to approval in March 1995, when it passed the
House of Representatives with a super majority but was one vote short in
the Senate.  Afterwards, Charles Schultze, an economist and former
director of the Office of Management and Budget, published a journal
article against the amendment while James Buchanan, an economist and
Nobel laureate, published a journal article in favor of the amendment.
Both economists made predictions and arguments for or against the need
and efficacy of a balanced budget back in 1990s.  Roughly fifteen years
passed between then and the amendment’s failure to pass in 2011.  So is
the 1995 styled balanced budget amendment an effective mechanism to
stabilize government debt?  This is a complicated, speculative question
due to the difficulty of forecasting, unpredictable politics, and both
authors’ economic ideologies.
II.  Core of the Issue
The purpose of a balanced federal budget amendment is to permanently
confine deficit spending so as to control the federal debt (Buchanan 1997,
118).  Federal debt is the total amount accumulated from all past,
outstanding deficits to be paid with tax revenues or refinanced with more
2
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debt sometime in the future.  The term “federal debt” is often vague and
can be misleading because there are different types of federal debt. The
most pertinent form is the federal public debt, a portion of which is held
by the Federal Reserve for open market operations and the rest is held by
the general public. It is part of some mutual funds, foreign investments,
and grandpa-purchased savings bonds for a grandchild’s college fund.
The gross federal debt consists of public debt plus money owed to
government agencies such as Social Security which controls the Old-Age
and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance trust funds.  Some
reports define federal debt as a combination of federal gross debt and
state and local debt (Rosen and Gayer, 2010: 466).  Others include
unfunded liabilities like Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security that are
not presently covered by issued debt. These unfunded liabilities are debt
not yet incurred, based on projected trends of entitlement program growth
and projected revenue shortfalls creating deficits unless the programs are
changed.  Federal debt could also include contingent liabilities which are
debts not accrued but could be due to government guarantees should their
owners run into trouble; examples include Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(Chinn and Freiden 2011, 87-119).  This distinction among the types of
debt is important as the balanced budget amendment would only directly
interfere with the growth of public debt.
Public debt is most crucial of all forms of debt because it is traded
publicly and requires faith in the federal government’s ability to pay back
the debt that it owes with interest.  Government demand for savings has
to compete with other forms of investment and, theoretically, as federal
debt increases it will crowd out private investment and raise interest rates
if there is no proportionate increase in the supply of savings.  Interest
rates can also rise if investors see the government as more risky because
of perceptions that the government will not pay its debts.  If the risk is too
high investors may not lend at all (Rosen and Gayer 2010, 461-473).  
The risk of running out of lenders is exclusive to public debt, because
trust funds are essentially the government owing the government.  Trust
funds, however, represent a form of future public debt, should their
outlays exceed their revenues and the difference is paid with public debt
instead of other revenues.  Unfunded liabilities also include other non
trust-fund programs as do contingent liabilities and function the same
way, so actual public debt could be much larger in the future than what
is presently reported, which leads to fears about growing public debt.
Interest payments could consume larger portions of the federal budget due
3
Harbaugh: Would the 1995 Balanced Budget Amendment be an Effective Mechanis
Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 2013
Major Themes in Economics, Spring 201362
to the increased size of the debt, especially if interest rates rise.  We
would then have to borrow more for the same spending if there were no
changes in revenues.   A graver scenario is that lenders will no longer
finance and refinance public debt leaving the government with three main
options.  It could tax the nation to pay back the debt it owes, it could
default on the debt by not paying, or it could attempt to monetize the debt
(Rosen and Gayer 2010, 461-473).
Full tax repayment would be strenuous, but if all of the public debt
were internal, the result would just be redistributive. This is to say income
or wealth would be transferred from citizens to repay the debt held by
other citizens.  The problem is that 54% of the 2010 public debt is
external so the taxed income and wealth would leave the country.  In
addition, there would be transaction costs for redistribution and potential
inefficient allocations even if the debt were 100% internal.  There is also
the issue of income redistribution between generations.
Simply defaulting on the debt would erode almost any chance of
future government borrowing for emergencies, cause upheaval in global
financial markets, and destroy the benefits the U.S. receives from having
a reserve currency. It would also be unconstitutional (Rosen and Gayer
2010, 461- 473).   Forcing, circumventing, controlling, or abolishing the
Federal Reserve to print currency to buy the outstanding debt (monetizing
the debt) would cause similar chaos with the addition of destructive
hyperinflation (Miskin 2010, 628).
The goal of a balanced budget is to prevent an unsustainable debt
spiral, produced by reckless deficit spending, which results in
macroeconomic chaos (Buchanan 1997, 135).  Yet the amendment only
addresses current-year public debts, so when is public debt unsustainable?
There is no definite answer, but the measurement is usually based on the
ratio of public debt to gross domestic product (GDP) where a lower
percentage is preferred to a higher one and we might not know where the
line is until after it has been crossed (Abel, Bernanke, and Croushore
2008, 341-343).  
The justification for some deficits is to promote GDP stability, and
thus debt stability.  This is where Schultze and Buchanan strongly
disagree.  Schulze claims that goals of full employment and low inflation
are better maintained by monetary policy, but fiscal policy with deficits
may be required occasionally in times of recession.  He is not against
running federal surpluses for unfunded liabilities like Medicaid,
Medicare, and Social Security, which he believes should be reformed to
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avoid major future deficits (Schultze 1995, 317).  Buchanan views
government responsibly using deficit financing is a pipe dream, because
politicians are only concerned with the next election, which is easier to
win with fewer taxes and more spending.  He puts little faith in practical
Keynesian economics from politicians who lack the incentives from their
constituents as well as the knowledge and ability for effective fiscal
policy.  He doesn’t touch on preventing future increases in public debt,
but pushes the amendment as a way to control pressures for public debt
as they occur (Buchanan 1997, 120)
 
III.  Lagged Implementation and Political Irresponsibility
To maintain a federal balanced budget, the budget must first be balanced.
Instead of immediately shocking the deficit-financed system, the balanced
budget amendment of 1995 required the deficit to gradually fall until it
was near zero in 2002.  This is known as lagging, an issue that Buchanan
favors as it shapes expectations by setting a date in stone.  Schultze
claims this will only lead to a longer implementation date.  (Buchanan
1997, 124; Schultze 1995, 321).
Schultze suggests that citizens suffer from cognitive dissidence; they
want to maintain their favorite programs, despise increases in taxes, and
are in favor of a balanced budget.  As a result, the budget is in the red and
politicians receive mixed signals for trying to balance the budget
(Schultze 1995, 321).  This is essentially the previously stated argument
that Buchanan gives for why governments, set free by the excuse of
Keynesian philosophy, run continuous budget deficits (Buchanan1997,
120). Schultze, however, points out that a large portion of federal
spending is nondiscretionary and will occur even if politicians do nothing
(Schultze 1995, 322).  Congress must actually change these programs by
somehow reducing their payments if revenues are held constant.
Nondiscretionary spending includes Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid,
farming subsidies, and veterans’ benefits. These programs made up ~60%
of the federal budget in both 1995 and in 2011 (Austin and Levitt 2012,
10).  Schultze claims that as citizens feel the effects of phased-in tax hikes
or spending cuts, there will be less support for balancing the budget,  and
a desire to push back implementation by threats to politician’s careers;
that is the major incentive for them to run continuous deficit (Schultze
1995, 322).  Buchanan, on the other hand, asserts that the size of the lag
cannot increase because constitutional deadlines do not provide
extensions (Buchanan 1997, 125).
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Schultze provides an interesting finding on the difficulties of a
balanced budget amendment.  During the “Clinton surpluses” from 1998
through 2001, total debt actually rose every year despite the on-budget
surplus for those years.  This occurred because trust funds for Social
Security, which are financed by the payroll tax, are spent according to
payments owed to beneficiaries.  When collected taxes are greater than
benefits paid, there is a surplus that the trust fund invests solely in federal
debt, is used for federal spending, and is not counted as public debt
(Rosen and Gayer 2010, 239-240).  Since the on-budget surplus was not
greater than the surplus of the trust funds, the total debt rose.  Separating
the revenues and expenditures from trust fund systems, Schultze provided
two graphs to try to dampen the arguments for a balanced budget.  These
graphs are updated from 1996 to 2011 (OMB 2012).
General Operating Receipts and Outlays as a Percentage of GDP
Source: Derived from OMB 2012: 1.4, 2.1, 3.1
Trust Fund Receipts and Outlays as a Percent of GDP
Source: Derived from OMB 2013: 1.4
Recession
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Schultz first attempts to debunk the idea that government spending is
out of control as the general operating expenditures remained fairly
constant as a percentage of GDP with a downward trend from his 1995
reference point, which would have been more pronounced if interest on
the debt was removed from the equation.  This argument might shed light
on some discretionary spending constraints but does not consider the
growth in trust fund government spending as a portion of GDP even
though it was running a surplus.  His second attack is on the notion that
current taxpayers and politicians are short sighted and discount the future
costs of current deficits.  His main argument is that when politicians were
confronted with possible deficits for Social Security in the 1980’s, they
raised the payroll tax and increased future full-retirement ages.  This is
supposed to be taken as political responsibility, but the argument seems
to disprove his point.  Current retired citizen are more likely to vote and
have a vested interest in Social Security while citizens too young to vote
incurred most of the cost for higher taxes and later retirement dates.  The
old received the benefits and the young paid the costs.  This argument
also doesn’t justify the majority of years where there was an on-budget
deficit without a recession.  He does provide Keynesian responses for
some deficit years but that only begs the question of political
irresponsibility and whether there should be a balanced budget (OMB
2013, 1.4; Schultze 1995, 322-325).  
So is lagging of the balanced budget amendment an issue for delayed
implementation? If the amendment would have passed and been lagged
till 2002, Schultze’s argument seems invalid because the operating budget
was almost balanced and the on-budget was running a surplus in 2001 by
that time without countervailing political force.  However, the lag did
occur during an unusual expansionary period for GDP and would have
been cut short by a recession and September 11th occurring less than a
month before fiscal year 2002.  Had there been no major adjustments in
fiscal policy from President George W. Bush, the lag would have worked
and the amendment would have been thoroughly tested.
IV.  The Amendment and Rules of the Game
A balanced budget amendment does not necessarily mean that
government projected revenues and expenditures will balance for every
fiscal year.  In fact the amendment in 1995 had three main rules: a three-
fifths vote by both houses of Congress was required to not balance
7
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expenditures with revenues; the same voting system was required to raise
the debt ceiling or to raise taxes.  So the budget can be unbalanced if
Congress votes to run a deficit.  That might require a second vote to raise
the debt ceiling.  Cutting expenditures is relatively easier than raising
revenues to bring the budget back into balance.  The budget can
hypothetically be unbalanced in favor of a surplus or deficit even if
Congress takes no action because projected revenues and expenditures
can differ from actual values due to forecasting errors and changes in the
economy (Schultze 1995, 317).
Buchanan has a classification system as to whether a rule is
procedural or substantive.  The default balanced budget and static debt
ceiling are procedural because the outcome for near zero deficits is
provided, but Congress is free on how to achieve it and can vote to run a
deficit.  The rule to constrain raising taxes is substantive because it
prescribes how to achieve the outcome: cutting expenditures, unless
Congress votes otherwise.  Buchanan favors procedural rules to achieve
the outcome of constraining deficit spending and debt growth but has less
to say about the way the goal is achieved (Buchanan, 1997; 125).  Schulze
on the other hand is much more concerned about substantive rules of
balancing the federal budget and that politicians will maneuver around the
rules (Schultze, 1995: 317).  
Buchanan argues that constitutional policies provide choices among
rules while ordinary policies provide choice within rules.  The
amendment constrains the legislative branch to have a balanced budget
but it is free to pursue how to balance the budget.  He goes further in
stating that ordinary policies will not balance the budget because
politicians have incentives to choose to not tax for what they spend
(Buchanan 1997, 125).  Schulze argues that even if these rules force the
federal on-budget items to be balanced, that the balance could come from
changes in other ordinary policies such as regulation, shifting accounts
off-budget, and forcing states to finance federal programs (Schultze 1995,
326-327).  
Both arguments are speculative because the constitutional amendment
has never been enacted, but in 1995 two studies performed regressions to
determine the effectiveness of different states’ constitutional procedures
to balance their general operating budgets.  The first study found that
states with rules that only force the governor to submit a balanced budget
and states that are allowed to carry over their unexpected deficits are
much less likely to run a surplus.  States that are not allowed to carry over
8
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unexpected deficits are more likely to run surpluses and the effect is
increased if the budget is biannual.  States with a “no carry” rule are also
more likely to run a surplus if the governor has line-item veto power to
cut specific areas in expenditures and if the state Supreme Court justices
are elected and not appointed (Ahmed 1996, 79-84).  Using Buchanan’s
game theory of federal choice and the states’ finding, simply submitting
a forecasted balance budget may not be entirely effective for reducing
federal deficits but the inability to raise the debt limit could force a built-
in surplus as a buffer.  The option of an executive line item veto is not
provided in the 1995 constitutional amendment and was interpreted by the
Supreme Court as unconstitutional when President Clinton tried to enact
one (Biskupic and Dewar1998).
V.  Effectiveness of a Debt Limit
Buchanan has a case for the importance of rules, but the most important
rule from the states, explicitly stating that the federal government cannot
carry an unexpected deficit, is only implicitly and contingently provided
by the debt ceiling rule (Buchanan 1997, 129). The second study of state
budgets examined why states were more likely to have a “no carry” rule
and found that states with high levels of federal grant aid as a percentage
of state revenues or states with larger expenditures were more likely to
have such a rule and states with higher per capita income were less likely
to have a such a rule (Ahmed 1996, 84-85).  States with a “no carry” rule
have a hard debt limit of zero for their operating budgets whereas the
federal government could still raise its soft debt limit.  The states also
have a separate capital budget, so the state to federal comparison is once
again not equitable but interesting, should more than two-fifths of one
federal house refuse to raise the debt ceiling. 
The federal government already has a self-imposed statutory debt
limit that requires Congress to allow the Executive branch to finance the
shortfall of revenues.  The House of Representatives is the only institution
constitutionally able to tax.  Either the Senate or the House can start
expenditures legislation but both legislative bills have to be agreed on by
both houses.  The president can submit a budget to Congress but has no
real power to enforce it aside from a budget veto that can be overridden.
The Executive branch must raise the appropriated revenues and distribute
the expenditures with the Treasury Department covering the difference
should the two not match.  Essentially Congress has to allow the Treasury
9
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to push debt over the statutory limit, and if Congress hesitates, the
Treasury must take “extraordinary measures” to cut other funding for the
federal government to pay its outstanding obligations.  If the Treasury can
make no more cuts to items like the civil servants’ pensions, then the
federal government will be forced to default on its outstanding obligations
(OMB 2013, 7.3). 
The history of the debt ceiling is a gradual transfer from specific
congressionally approved debt instruments to present day Treasury-
controlled debt instruments with Congress enforcing the upper limit of
debt the federal government is allowed to have.  There is no knowing
what the debt would have been had there been no debt limit and the rule
of raising the debt limit would technically be harder under a constitutional
amendment as it requires a three-fifths majority in both houses of
Congress.  That said, the Senate has the option of a filibuster, which
requires a three-fifths vote to approve a statutory law that normally
requires a simple majority. This is a strange and complicated ritual but it
might provide insight into how a balanced budget would work in practice.
The graph below, denominated in millions, shows the relationship of
the debt ceiling to gross debt and public debt since 1940 (OMB 2013).
Source: Derived from OMB 2013: 7.1,7.2
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Perhaps a stricter debt limit with a required near balance of revenues and
expenditures would be effective for slowing or reversing the statutory
growth of gross debt, like a strict no carry rule for states (Amed 1996,
79).  There are some complications as the on-budget could be balanced
by a surplus in the trust funds, which would cause gross debt to increase
more than a reduction in public debt, which would require the limit to rise
if gross debt was at the limit.  Yet the biggest problem with the limit is
similar to the events leading to the fiscal cliff, where politicians
threatened not to raise the debt limit as a partisan strategy.  This could
have meant that outlays, like interest payments, would not have been paid
with debt because there was a built-in deficit in the budget, which would
lead to a default.  Standard and Poor’s downgraded the U.S.’s debt from
AAA to AA+ in part due to this fiasco which implies that the debt has
more risk and should incur higher interest rates, though that is not what
happened (Pylas 2013).  This problem begs the question of what would
happen if Congress submitted a balanced budget instead.  
VI.  Efficacy with Uncertainty and Automatic Stabilizers
Having a balanced budget amendment and having a perfectly balanced
budget are two different concepts with the latter being extremely hard to
achieve.  The rules of the amendment state that projected outlays and
receipts must match, not that the two will actually match in a fiscal year
(Schultze 1995, 325).  This is a twofold problem because forecasting
revenues for a year with 100% accuracy is impossible and some
expenditures increase or decrease without immediate control of the
government for the same year.  There is an unintended budget surplus if
actual revenues for the year are higher than actual expenditures for the
year.  However an unintended deficit may occur if the opposite occurs
and this will cause a problem if the deficit will push the government debt
over the limit.  
The federal government receives  about 91% of its revenue from three
forms of taxes that depend on income: Individual income tax, payroll tax,
and corporate tax.  Without going into the extreme intricacies and
loopholes of what type of income is taxed, there are major problems in
trying to predict how much income there will be in a given year.  The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) both try to forecast the two-year change in wage and
salary disbursements plus corporate book profits as a share of GDP.  An
11
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obvious problem for both agencies is trying to predict changes in nominal
GDP.  Between 1976 and 2004 both agencies always either over or under
predicted the two-year growth rate of nominal GDP by an average of 1.5
percentage points.  If forecasted GDP growth is 3%, the actual rate could
be between 1.5% and 4.5 % on average.   Projected revenues as a portion
of GDP are more difficult to calculate when the whole of GDP is not
certain.  Similarly, both agencies miscalculated changes in the percentage
of GDP that is taxable by an average of 1.1 percentage points.  The CBO
says that forecasting taxable income is even more difficult due to
statistical discrepancies in national income and product accounts, changes
in non-taxable fringe benefits, and changes in the tax codes such as
increasing the amount of capital depreciation so corporations can show
lower profits to tax.  This is not to say these agencies forecasts are
worthless or that the overestimated revenue deficits they would create
would be larger than the status quo, but the main point is that revenues for
a year are uncertain (CBO 2006, 8, 12).   
There is also a forecasting problem on the expenditure side, mostly
dealing with mandatory expenditures.  The federal government approves
discretionary spending with a budget but changes to mandatory spending
require an alteration to the program.   Forecasts can attempt to make a
guess as to how much will be spent, but precisely determining when every
American will retire, lose their job, fall under the poverty line, become ill,
etc, is not feasible.  This is a problem. Should there be an unexpected
recession in the fiscal year, welfare and unemployment benefits will rise
and incomes will fall so tax revenues will decrease.  These are known as
automatic stabilizers and are intended to stimulate aggregate demand and
reduce the depth and length of a recession without any political action
(CBO 2010, 1-3).  Schultze states that “in the 50 years since the second
World War, the American economy has been far more stable than it was
in the era between the Civil War and the Second World War… which
many economics credit to automatic stabilizers in the federal budget”
(Schultze 1995, 325).  Buchanan is skeptical of Keynesian economics and
favors a stable money supply but views the legislative reality of such
stabilizers as a matter of interpretation. He argues that the deficit can be
corrected in the next budget with some pragmatism (Buchanan 1997,
129).  In either case, if the federal budget were forecast to be balanced
without the knowledge of a recession, the actual budget would be in
deficit, as tax revenues would decrease while automatic expenditures
would increase.  
12
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Deficits and Surpluses as a Percent of GDP due to Automatic Stabilizers
Source: Derived from CBO 2010:5-6
Schultz asserts the federal government should balance a high
employment budget and if the there is a recession, the stabilizers would
serve their Keynesian function, and the deficit would be capped at no
more than 2% of gross national product to be paid back in three years
(Schultze 1996, 325-326). Alternatively, politicians could use more
conservative forecasts of expenditures and revenues as if the economy
were in a recession given current tax rates; revenues would be
underestimated and expenditures would be overestimated, providing
margins for error.  If the economy is in expansion, then there is a built-in
surplus, and if there is a recession there may be a decreased surplus or a
deficit depending on the level of precaution.  Theoretically, the surpluses
would counteract the deficits so the public debt could potentially be
absolutely reduced or at least grow slower.  That dependson the level of
precaution and changes in the growth rate of GDP and non-budget
government intervention.  While Schultze does give a forecasting plan
based on full employment he quickly rejects the idea because politicians
can manipulate full employment and other projections to build in deficits.
Buchanan counters this notion by suggesting that non-partial parties
should provide the forecasts (Schultz 1995, 326; Buchanan 1995, 129).
Assuming that the federal government does attempt a projected
balanced budget, what would happen if an unforeseen deficit did occur?
The state of Iowa has a balanced budget amendment and forecasts
revenues with a Bayesian range instead of predicted growth rates.
Unfortunately, the forecasted revenues for the center of the bell curve are
13
Harbaugh: Would the 1995 Balanced Budget Amendment be an Effective Mechanis
Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 2013
Major Themes in Economics, Spring 201372
seldom achieved and tend to be overestimated: some years the actual
shortfall of revenue had a predicted ~0% probability of happening.  When
the Iowa state government discovers there will be a deficit, it cuts
spending during the year to eliminate the deficit (Lewis and Whitemen
2008, 9).  Instead of having a built-in surplus to correct for shortfalls, the
federal government could just cut spending to make up the difference and
try to avoid going over the debt limit. Correction of an unexpected deficit
could also occur by raising taxes, but raising taxes is far less publicly
favorable, slower to respond, and more difficult due to the rule requiring
a three-fifths majority in both houses of Congress (Schultz 1995, 318).
The federal government often adds on additional spending after the
unified budget is voted on, which is known as supplemental
appropriations (Kliesen and Thornton 2012).  These additional non-
budgeted expenditures can be used to cover disasters such as hurricanes,
additional financing for wars, or approved stimulus packages.  This is
another problem for the rule of forecasted revenues matching forecasted
benefits.  The federal Supreme Court would have to decide whether it is
constitutionally legal for Congress does to allow forecasted revenues to
not equal forecasted expenditures. The federal government could try to
budget for these contingencies, but that is not explicitly stated in the three
main rules of the amendment (Schultze 1995, 327).
 
Source: Derived from Kliesen and Thornton 2012: 31
If the federal government does follow its rules it could still continue
deficit financing, though the process would require more votes.  In
January of 2001 the Congressional Budget Office forecasted that budget
surpluses would continue till 2011 for cumulative surpluses of $5.6
trillion.  In reality, the accumulated deficits for the ten-year period were
14
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$6.1 trillion (CBO 2012, 1).  Had the balanced budget passed and been
implemented in 2002 how would Congress have reacted to the events
between 2001 and 2011?  Would the lag have prevented the tax cut of
2001 in response to a recession?  Would the amendment have stopped
wars in Afghanistan or Iraq, the additional tax cuts in 2003 and 2005, or
the stimulus spending of 2008?  As long as three-fifths of both houses of
Congress agreed to raise the debt limit and let expenditures outpace
revenues, the answer is no.  
Jumping through these additional hoops might have deterred more
senators and representatives from passing additional legislation and
perhaps more offsets in cutting certain expenditures would have occurred.
Below are voting majorities from some of the major legislation that the
CBO cites for creating the $11.7 trillion negative turnaround from debt
reduction to debt increase over the 2001 to 2011 period.  These votes are
not a great proxy for speculating whether Congress would have also voted
in favor of not balancing the budget but are informative because some
bills did not have a three-fifths majority in both houses, so maybe these
bills would not have passed knowing the deficits they would create (CBO
2012, 1).
Source: Derived from votes according to govtrack.com
VII.  Efficiency in Stabilizing the Public Debt to GDP Ratio
As previously mentioned, the federal government has allowed both
nominal gross and public debt to rise due to unbalanced budgets and a
loose limit on nominal debt growth.  However, the more important debt
measurement, the public debt-to-GDP ratio, was higher in the late 1940’s
than 2011 and fell mainly because of the end of war deficits and GDP
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rising faster than nominal public debt (Schultz 1995, 321).  What makes
the 2010’s different than the 1940’s is the projected increase of debt due
to unfunded liabilities.  Estimates vary in size, but are in the trillions; two
separate forecasts predic that unfunded liabilities will be $79 trillion or
$211 trillion (Hummel 2012, 24).  This future increase in spending is
attributed to the aging of America and rising healthcare costs, so there
will be more expenditures with a simultaneous withdrawal from the
revenue base.  
Source: Derived from Office of Management Historic Tables
The gross debt will likely change composition as trust fund debts are
repaid because their programs are running deficits.  The federal
government will have to raise revenues, cut expenditures, or finance the
deficit with public debt.  The federal government could reform these
programs now, but no rule of the balanced budget amendment forces the
Congress to make proactive policy changes.  The federal budget could use
accrual accounting to estimate and realize future unbalanced budgets and
correct mandatory spending or tax revenues for future balance. Yet this
is not set by the rules and would be extremely hard to estimate and revise.
Schultze’s main case for the threat of debt is the future realization of
unfunded liabilities that would be better to fix in the present with
pragmatic legislation then wait and make unpopular, reactive spending
cuts or tax increases when debts cannot be accumulated (Schultz 1995,
320).  That is not to say Congress cannot do this on its own; it reformed
Social Security in 1983, reformed AFDC to create TANF in 1995, and
passed the Affordable Healthcare Act that may or may not reduce future
16
Major Themes in Economics, Vol. 15 [2013], Art. 7
https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol15/iss1/7
Harbaugh: Would the 1995 Balanced Budget Amendment 75
costs to the federal government by reducing the largest unfunded
liabilities: Medicaid and Medicare (Rosen and Gayer 2010, 180-275).  
There is also the issue of contingent liabilities.  These are also not
addressed by the amendment and would have the same unpopular effects
as unfunded liabilities should these unknown debts have to be paid.  Some
contingent liabilities like wars or disasters have already been mentioned
with supplemental appropriations, with the remedy that they could be
budgeted for since world peace is unlikely.  The other portion of
contingent liabilities is much more debatable, with regards to financial
bailouts, deposits insurance, and loan guarantees.  The argument about
automatic stabilizers between such economic titans as Hayak and Keynes
illustrates what, if anything, should fiscal policy do to influence the
business cycle, and the same issue divides Buchanan and Schultze
(Wapshott 2012).  Taking Buchanan’s side means there is no reason for
fiscal policy to stimulate the economy.  Taking this approach and
assuming monetary policy cannot push interest rates below zero, a major
recession or depression would not only mean reduced GDP but possibly
deflation until the downturn corrected itself.  Both factors would increase
the public debt-to-GDP ratio since debt is in past nominal terms.  On the
other hand with Schultz, fiscal stimulus from the tax cuts of 2001 and
resulting the resulting deficits created changes in capital flows that could
have been a factor in the boom based recession of 2008 (Chinn 2012, 175-
200).  Perhaps there is danger in attempting to fiscally fine tuning an
economy and producing mal investment but the federal debt already exists
and huge drops in GDP and increases in deflation would increase the
danger from federal debt.
VIII.  Changes in Substantive Budget Choice
The tax rule is aimed at forcing a substantive political choice for
influencing GDP.  Taxes pose a burden on markets and most taxes have
an excess burden.  They usually result in higher prices with less output.
According to the Laffer curve, taxes rates that are set too high will result
in less tax revenue as incomes fall due to increased tax rates.  Both of
these ideas make the tax rule appealing because GDP growth would be
less suppressed. There is also an implicit cap on the size government from
difficulty in raising taxes to increase expenditures.  Assuming that some
government spending is wasteful and there is potential for government
failures then GDP growth is less hindered.  By this reasoning the tax rule
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address the denominator of the federal debt’s stability, but is that the
whole story? Schultze protests this rule because of other substantive
political choices that could be more inefficient, given increased austerity
(Schultze 1995, 320).
There was an estimated $1 trillion loss of tax revenues in 2008 due
to tax expenditures.  Tax expenditures are items not taxed or taxed less
than the normal rate.  These items include capital gains, employer paid
health insurance and pensions, mortgage interest payments, and
“giveaways” to certain industries.  Regardless of their intent, tax
expenditures create a market distortion.  Eliminating all of these tax
expenditures would bring the federal budget closer to balance.  This
would also forgo whatever the intent was of the reduced tax that could
have been socially efficient due to a positive externality.  The same could
negative externalities where certain taxes that decrease output increase
social efficiency, so writing all taxes off as pure inefficiencies seems rash
(Rosen and Gayer 2010, 397).  The issue decreased efficiency from
excess burden could come from changes of what should actually be taxed
at an optimal rate: income, consumption, and excise (Turnovsky 1996,
21).
By the same reasoning, government expenditures, the reason we have
taxes, should go towards improving macroeconomic efficiency.  Social
Security has a negative correlation with national savings, unemployment
insurance correlates with longer periods of unemployment, and Medicaid
correlates with overconsumption of medical goods.  However, these
social insurance programs reduce the risk of adverse selection, creating
some external benefits, complicating their reform (Feldstein 1974; Rosen
and Gayer 2010, 190, 290).  The purest public good, national defense, is
perhaps the most sacred of expenditure cows but determining an optimal
level is much more complicated than a vertical summation individual
demand curves; specialized military personal with benefits, thousands of
variations of capital investment, strategic nuclear reserves, all play into
the incomprehensible equation for efficiency.  Wars are a sad byproduct
of the human condition and the net present value for the U.S. invasion of
Iraq from 2003 to 2006 was estimated at conservative -$1 trillion to a
moderate -$2 trillion (Bilmes and Stigliz 2006, 30).  
Speculating on a basket of programs with the highest net present
value and an optimal tax policy would be an extremely costly endeavor
and subject to forecasting errors, not to mention conclusions that could
be contrary to many ethical values of citizens.  That said, any actions of
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the government have costs and benefits on top of the income
redistribution from government revenues to government expenditures.
How the federal government presently makes these decisions affects the
macro economy. Yet the logic of the tax rule is a half truth because the
government could keep inefficient programs and cut efficient ones.
Political, not economic, pressures from a balanced budget could distort
these substantive choices even without deficit financing.  
If politicians are myopic, would it make sense to vote for policies and
programs that do not have immediate or clear returns to voters, regardless
of how big those returns might be in terms of GDP growth, over policies
that have clear and immediate returns?  Using the basics of the Solow
growth model, there are three main areas that the government could
influence to promote GDP growth: labor, capital, and technology (Abel,
Bernanke, and Croushore 2008, 223-240).  Immigration reform could be
used to increase overall GDP, even if per capita income would not
change.  Capital public goods could be better funded, stimulus spending
or not, to raise the U.S.’s D+ grade for infrastructure from the American
Society of Civil.  Higher federal funding for basic research could lead to
higher levels of development research from business, probably increasing
technological change, and increasing future GDP as a result (The
Economist 2013, 5-14).  The problem with these funds is that they would
compete with more politically focused spending for fewer revenues and
probably be reduced because of their long term, obscure returns.
Research and infrastructure are investments with possible returns for
future generations. Assuming the future generations will benefit from the
investment, they could also pay for it under the benefits received
principle.  This means that these items should be funded with debt via a
capital budget, which would make them more competitive with other
expenditures. 
Buchanan offers the counter case of capital budgeting in a balanced
budget amendment.  He argues that current taxpayers should pay for
current benefits of government investments like infrastructure because it
is constantly being rebuilt (Buchanan 1997, 132). His argument does not
address underfunding, but this could be remedied by individual state’s
capital budgets.  There is the potential for unfunded mandates so that
states have to make certain investments that may not be efficient for a
state’s needs or place an inefficient burden on a state with external
benefits to other states from its investment. 
If continuous deficit spending is always a problem as Buchanan
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argues, then politicians may move to off-budget government policies to
achieve their goals.  Schultze takes this one step further, claiming that
most of the burden of policies to personal and business budgets could
shift to regulations, since the amendment makes tax increases difficult to
match expenditures for policies.  He goes so far as to say that in one
generation the U.S. could go from being one of the least regulated
economies in the world to one of the most regulated (Schultze 1995, 327).
Once again this is a speculative argument and the U.S. already has
regulations, but would the tradeoff between reducing the debt be offset by
counterproductive regulations that would reduce GDP growth?
A major problem with democracies or republics stems from the
rationality of people.  Americans may behave rationally in many instances
for private matters but tend to hold irrational beliefs in political matters.
To be more specific, Americans tend to favor counterproductive
economic policies against free markets, international trade, technological
progress, labor conservation, and are pessimistic about economic growth.
If the U.S. were a direct democracy, economic growth would probably be
significantly reduced.  The U.S. is a republic, at least at the federal level,
and representatives have the ability to circumvent the irrational demands
of the people (Caplan 2007, 23-49).  Granted, there is a minimum wage,
some trade restrictions, federally guaranteed loans for college and
housing, a war on drugs, restrictions on medication, etc, and these policies
are inefficient in many cases, but require deeper analysis for each case.
Not all regulations have implicit costs higher than their implicit benefits,
but a speculative estimate put total costs to small businesses at $1 trillion
a year for federal regulation (Crane 2005).  Politicians already regulate
for better and worse. It would be a complete shot in the dark to predict if
Congress would substitute more inefficient regulation that would offset
the net benefits of deficit reduction.  Controlling Congress is reason for
the amendment. Yet the control Congress retains is the source of
opposition for the amendment.  So to reiterate what has been said before,
the degree of effectiveness from the amendment is largely in the hands of
politicians and the electorate.
IX.  Conclusion
The federal balanced budget amendment has a real possibility of being
proposed as a constitutional amendment by either the state legislators or
Congress in the future, though ratification would be a little harder.  Given
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enough time and the help of an economic expansion, the lag process could
be painless for implementing the amendment.  Yet the three rules
provided by the 1995 amendment do not give a clear answer as to how
effective a balanced budget amendment would be as a mechanism to
stabilize government debt.
Buchanan’s argument in favor of the balanced forecasted revenues
and expenditures rule as well as the debt limit rule would probably have
reduced or made it harder to run the deficits of 2002 to the present.  There
is political wiggle room to sneak in deficits or use three-fifths votes to
avoid Buchanan’s two favored rules and continue to run deficits.
However, this would have to be repeated every fiscal year and every time
the debt reached its limit.  With these continuous hurdles, it’s possible
that debt growth would have at least slowed.  An unexpected surplus
would reduce the need to raise the debt limit.  The 1995 amendment
doesn’t guarantee that the threat of federal debt would be controlled but
decreasing debt growth could be conducive to higher growth of GDP.
Schultze’s arguments are less concentrated on deficit reduction and
more on the amendment’s unintended consequences.  The tax freeze rule
alludes to the other component of controlling the threat of federal debt:
growth of GDP.  Arguments about politicians’ inefficient decisions in
response to the amendment are highly speculative.  Changes in regulation,
spending composition, investment, tax policy, program formats, and
macroeconomic phenomena are hard to measure and predict.  As far as
some economic ideological divides go, the change in congressional
behavior could have been a boon or a bane to the economy.  This implies
more uncertainty as to whether the threat of debt could be controlled.
The main point is that the 1995 balanced budget amendment was not
air tight on preventing deficits and that the true threat of debt is uncertain.
Future constitutional balanced budget amendments could be altered to
leave less room for political maneuverability in creating current and
future deficits but forecast errors will always be a problem.  Nor will
future amendments be able to remove all possible criticism so long as
there is a divide in politics, public finance, and macroeconomics.  
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